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Abstract
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model
involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form
a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete preference list over the agents of the next
type. We consider the open problem of the existence of three-dimensional matchings in which no
triple of agents prefer each other to their partners. Such matchings are said to be weakly stable.
We show that contrary to published conjectures, weakly stable three-dimensional matchings
need not exist. Furthermore, we show that it is NP-complete to determine whether a weakly
stable three-dimensional matchings exists. We achieve this by reducing from the variant of the
problem where preference lists are allowed to be incomplete. Our results can be generalized to
the k-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences for k ≥ 3.
1 Introduction
The study of stable matchings was started by Gale and Shapley [9], who investigated a market
with two types of agents. The two-dimensional stable matching problem involves an equal number
of men and women, each of whom has a complete preference list over the agents of the opposite
sex. The goal is to find a matching between the men and the women such that no man and woman
prefer each other to their partners. Matchings satisfying this property are said to be stable. Gale
and Shapley showed that a solution for the two-dimensional stable matching problem always exists
and can be computed in polynomial time. Their result also applies to the variant where preference
lists may be incomplete due to unacceptable partners, and the number of men may be different
from the number of women.
The problem of generalizing stable matchings to markets with three types of agents was posed
by Knuth [13]. In pursuit of an existence theorem and an elegant theory analogous to those of the
Gale-Shapley model, the three-dimensional stable matching problem has been studied with respect
to a number of preference structures. When each agent has preferences over pairs of agents from
the other two types, stable matchings need not exist [1, 15]. Furthermore, it is NP-complete to
determine whether a stable matching exists [15, 17], even if the preferences are consistent with
product orders [11]. When two types of agents care primarily about each other and secondarily
about the remaining type, a stable matching always exists and can be obtained by computing two-
dimensional stable matchings using the Gale-Shapley algorithm in a hierarchical manner [5]. When
the types form a cyclic order such that each type of agent cares primarily about the next type and
secondarily about the other type, stable matchings need not exist [3].
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A prominent problem mentioned in several of the aforementioned papers [3, 11, 15] is the three-
dimensional stable matching problem for the case where the types form a cyclic order such that each
type of agent cares only about the next type and not the other type. Following the terminology of
the survey of Manlove [14], we call this the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic
preferences (3-dsm-cyc), and refer to the three types of agents as men, women, and dogs. A number
of stability notions [11] can be considered in 3-dsm-cyc. In this paper, we focus on weak stability,
which is the most permissive one and has received the most attention in the literature. It is known
that determining whether a 3-dsm-cyc instance has a strongly stable matching is NP-complete [2].
For the variant where ties are allowed, determining the existence of a super-stable matching is also
NP-complete [12]. However, it remained an open problem for weakly stable matchings in 3-dsm-
cyc.
In 3-dsm-cyc, there are an equal number of men, women, and dogs. Each man has a complete
preference list over the women, each woman has a complete preference list over the dogs, and each
dog has a complete preference list over the men. A family is a triple consisting of a man, a woman,
and a dog. A matching is a set of agent-disjoint families. A family is strongly blocking if every
agent in the family prefers each other to their partners in the matching. A matching is weakly
stable if it admits no strongly blocking family. This problem is related to applications such as
kidney exchange [2] and three-sided network services [4].
The formulation of 3-dsm-cyc first appeared in the paper of Ng and Hirschberg [15], where it
is attributed to Knuth. Using a greedy approach, Boros et al. [3] showed that every 3-dsm-cyc
instance with at most 3 agents per type has a weakly stable matching. Their result also applies to
the k-dimensional generalization of the problem, which we call k-dsm-cyc. For k ≥ 3, they showed
that every k-dsm-cyc instance with at most k agents per type has a weakly stable matching. Using
a case analysis, Eriksson et al. [6] showed that every 3-dsm-cyc instance with at most 4 agents
per type has a weakly stable matching. Despite unbalancedness and the lack of stable effective
functions, Eriksson et al. conjectured that every 3-dsm-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching.
More precisely, they conjectured that for an extension of 3-dsm-cyc with the strongest link rule,
every instance with at least 2 agents per type has at least two weakly stable matchings. Using an
efficient greedy procedure, Hofbauer [10] showed that for k ≥ 3, every k-dsm-cyc instance with at
most k+1 agents per type has a weakly stable matching. Using a satisfiability problem formulation
and an extensive computer-assisted search, Pashkovich and Poirrier [16] showed that every 3-dsm-
cyc instance with exactly 5 agents per type has at least two weakly stable matchings. Escamocher
and O’Sullivan [7] showed that the number of weakly stable matchings is exponential in the size
of the 3-dsm-cyc instance if agents of the same type are restricted to have the same preferences.
They also conjectured that for unrestricted 3-dsm-cyc instances, there are exponentially many
weakly stable matchings.
Hardness results are known for some related problems. For the variant of 3-dsm-cyc where pref-
erence lists are allowed to be incomplete, which we refer to as 3-dsmi-cyc, Biro´ and McDermid [2]
showed that determining whether a weakly stable matching exists is NP-complete. Farczadi et
al. [8] showed that determining whether a given perfect two-dimensional matching can be extended
to a three-dimensional weakly stable matching in 3-dsm-cyc is also NP-complete. However, the
existence of weakly stable matchings in 3-dsm-cyc remained unresolved. Manlove [14] described
it as an “intriguing open problem”, and Woeginger [18] classified it as “hard and outstanding”.
Our Techniques and Contributions
In this paper, we show that there exists a 3-dsm-cyc instance that has no weakly stable matching.
This disproves the conjectures of Eriksson et al. [6] and Escamocher and O’Sullivan [7]. Further-
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more, we show that determining whether a 3-dsm-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching is
NP-complete. We achieve this by reducing from the problem of determining whether a 3-dsmi-cyc
instance has a weakly stable matching. Our results generalize to k-dsm-cyc for k ≥ 3.
Our main technique involves converting each agent in 3-dsmi-cyc to a gadget consisting of one
non-dummy agent and many dummy agents. The dummy agents in our gadget give rise to chains
of admirers. (See Remark 1 in Section 4.3.) By applying the weak stability condition to the chains
of admirers, we are able to obtain some control over the partner of the non-dummy agent.
Organization of This Paper
In Section 2, we present the formal definitions of k-dsm-cyc and k-dsmi-cyc. In Section 3, we
show that the NP-completeness result of Biro´ and McDermid [2] can be extended to k-dsmi-cyc. In
Section 4, we show that k-dsm-cyc is NP-complete by a reduction from k-dsmi-cyc. In Section 5,
we conclude by mentioning some potential future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we use 〈z ∈ Z | P(z)〉 to denote the list of all tuples z ∈ Z satisfying predicate P(z),
where the tuples are sorted in increasing lexicographical order. Given two lists Y and Z, we denote
their concatenation as Y · Z. For any k ≥ 1, we use ⊕k to denote addition modulo k.
2.1 The Models
Let k ≥ 2. The k-dimensional stable matching problem with incomplete lists and cyclic preferences
(k-dsmi-cyc) involves a finite set A = I ×{0, . . . , k− 1} of agents, where each agent α = (i, t) ∈ A
is associated with an identifier i and a type t. (When k = 3, we can think of the sets I × {0},
I × {1}, and I × {2} as the sets of men, women, and dogs, respectively.) Each agent α = (i, t) ∈ A
has a strict preference list Pα over a subset of agents of type t′ = t ⊕k 1. In other words, every
agent in I ×{t⊕k 1} appears in Pα at most once, and every element in Pα belongs to I ×{t⊕k 1}.
For every α, α′, α′′ ∈ A, we say that α prefers α′ to α′′ if α′ appears in Pα and either agent α′′
appears in Pα after α′ or agent α′′ does not appear in Pα. We denote this k-dsmi-cyc instance as
X = (A, {Pα}α∈A).
Given a k-dsmi-cyc instance X = (A, {Pα}α∈A), a family is a tuple
(α0, . . . , αk−1) ∈ Ak
such that αt ∈ I × {t} and αt⊕k1 appears in Pαt for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. A matching µ is
a set of agent-disjoint families. In other words, for every (α0, . . . , αk−1), (α′0, . . . , α′k−1) ∈ µ and
t, t′ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, if αt = α′t, then αt′ = α′t′ . Given a matching µ and an agent α ∈ A, if α = αt
for some (α0, . . . , αk−1) ∈ µ and t ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, we say that α is matched to αt⊕k1, and we write
µ(α) = αt⊕k1. Otherwise, we say that α is unmatched, and we write µ(α) = α.
Given a matching µ, we say that a family (α0, . . . , αk−1) is strongly blocking if αt prefers αt⊕k1
to µ(αt) for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. A matching µ is weakly stable if it does not admit any strongly
blocking family.
The k-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences (k-dsm-cyc) is defined as
the special case of k-dsmi-cyc in which every agent in I × {t⊕k 1} appears exactly once in Pα for
every agent α = (i, t) ∈ A.
Notice that when incomplete lists are allowed, the case of an unequal number of agents of
each type can be handled within our k-dsmi-cyc model by padding with dummy agents whose
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preference lists are empty. Hence, the results of Biro´ and McDermid [2] apply to our 3-dsmi-cyc
model. When preference lists are complete, we follow the literature and focus on the case where
each type has an equal number of agents. Our result shows that even when restricted to the case
of an equal number of agents of each type, a given k-dsm-cyc instance need not admit a weakly
stable matching, and determining the existence of a weakly stable matching is NP-complete.
2.2 Polynomial-Time Verification
Given a matching µ of a k-dsmi-cyc instance with n agents per type, it is straightforward to
determine whether µ is weakly stable in O(nk) time by checking that none of the O(nk) families
is strongly blocking. The following theorem shows that when k is large, there is a more efficient
method to determine whether a given matching is weakly stable.
Theorem 1. There exists a poly(n, k)-time algorithm to determine whether a given matching µ is
weakly stable for a k-dsmi-cyc instance, where n is the number of agents per type.
Proof. Given µ, consider the directed graph G with vertex set A such that there exists an edge
from α to α′ if and only if α prefers α′ to µ(α). Then cycles in G of length k correspond to strongly
blocking families of µ. Notice that if a cycle in G contains an agent in I×{t}, then it also contains
an agent in I × {t⊕k 1}. Hence no cycle in G has length less than k. Thus determining whether µ
is weakly stable is equivalent to determining whether the directed graph G has a cycle of length at
most k, which can be done in poly(n, k) time.
3 NP-Completeness of k-DSMI-CYC
In this section, we show that for every k ≥ 3, it is NP-complete to determine whether a given
k-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching. We achieve this by reducing from the problem
of determining whether a 3-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching.
3.1 The Reduction
Let k ≥ 4. Consider an input 3-dsmi-cyc instance X = (A, {Pα}α∈A) where A = I×{0, 1, 2}. Our
reduction constructs a k-dsmi-cyc instance Xˆ = (Aˆ, {Pˆαˆ}αˆ∈Aˆ) as follows.
• Let Iˆ = I×I and Aˆ = I×I×{0, . . . , k−1}. For every agent (i, t) ∈ A, we call αˆ = (i, i, t) ∈ Aˆ
the non-dummy agent corresponding to (i, t). We call the agents
{(i, j, t) ∈ Aˆ | t /∈ {0, 1, 2} or i 6= j}
dummy agents.
• For every agent αˆ = (i, j, t) ∈ Aˆ, we construct the preference list Pˆαˆ as follows.
– If 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and i = j, we list in Pˆαˆ the agents
{(i′, j′, t′) ∈ I × I × {t+ 1} | i′ = j′ and (i′, t′) is in P(i,t)}
in the order in which the corresponding agent (i′, t′) appears in P(i,t).
– If t = 2 and i = j, we list in Pˆαˆ the agents
{(i′, j′, t′) ∈ I × I × {3} | i′ = i and (j′, 0) is in P(i,2)}
in the order in which the corresponding agent (j′, 0) appears in P(i,2).
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– If 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 and i 6= j, we define Pˆαˆ as the empty list.
– If 3 ≤ t ≤ k − 2 and (j, 0) is in P(i,2), we define Pˆαˆ as 〈(i, j, t+ 1)〉.
– If t = k − 1 and (j, 0) is in P(i,2), we define Pˆαˆ as 〈(j, j, 0)〉.
– If 3 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 and (j, 0) is not in P(i,2), we define Pˆαˆ as the empty list.
Figure 1 shows an example of the reduction when k = 5 and I = {0, 1}.
3.2 Correctness of the Reduction
Lemma 1. Let k ≥ 4. Consider the reduction given in Section 3.1. The output k-dsmi-cyc
instance Xˆ has a weakly stable matching if and only if the input 3-dsmi-cyc instance X has
a weakly stable matching.
Proof. Since every family in Xˆ has the form
((i0, i0, 0), (i1, i1, 1), (i2, i2, 2), (i2, i0, 3), . . . , (i2, i0, k − 1)),
where (i0, i1, i2) is a family in X, there is a-one-to-one correspondence between families in Xˆ and
families in X. This induces a one-to-one correspondence between matchings in Xˆ and matchings
in X. It is straightforward to see that a family in Xˆ is a strongly blocking family of a matching
in Xˆ if and only if the corresponding family in X is a strong blocking family of the corresponding
matching in X. Hence Xˆ has a weakly stable matching if and only if X has a weakly stable
matching.
Theorem 2. Let k ≥ 3. Then there exists a k-dsmi-cyc instance that has no weakly stable
matching.
Proof. Biro´ and McDermid [2, Lemma 1] show that there exists a 3-dsmi-cyc instance X that has
no weakly stable matching. So we may assume that k ≥ 4. Then Lemma 1 implies that given X
as an input, the reduction in Section 3.1 produces a k-dsmi-cyc instance Xˆ that has no weakly
stable matching.
Theorem 3. Let k ≥ 3. Then it is NP-complete to determine whether a k-dsmi-cyc instance has
a weakly stable matching.
Proof. Biro´ and McDermid [2, Theorem 1] show that it is NP-complete to determine whether
a 3-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching. So we may assume that k ≥ 4. Then
Lemma 1 implies the correctness of the reduction from 3-dsmi-cyc to k-dsmi-cyc presented in
Section 3.1. Moreover, the reduction can be implemented in poly(n, k) time, where n is the number
of agents of each type. Theorem 1 implies that the problem of determining whether a k-dsmi-
cyc instance has a weakly stable matching is in NP. Thus the problem of determining whether
a k-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching is NP-complete.
4 NP-Completeness of k-DSM-CYC
In this section, we show that for every k ≥ 3, it is NP-complete to determine whether a k-dsm-
cyc instance has a weakly stable matching. We achieve this by reducing from the problem of
determining whether a k-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching. Since the dimensions
of both the input instance and the output instance of the reduction are equal to k, throughout this
section, we write ⊕ instead of ⊕k for better readability.
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(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
(0, 2)
(1, 2)
(a) The input 3-dsmi-cyc instance.
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 2)
(1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2)
(0, 0, 3)
(0, 1, 3)
(1, 1, 3)
(0, 0, 4)
(0, 1, 4)
(1, 1, 4)
(b) The output 5-dsmi-cyc instance. Agents with empty preference lists are omitted.
Figure 1: Example of a reduction from 3-dsmi-cyc to 5-dsmi-cyc. An arrow indicates that the
target agent appears in the preference list of the source agent.
4.1 The Reduction
Let k ≥ 3. Consider an input k-dsmi-cyc instance X = (A, {Pα}α∈A) where A = I×{0, . . . k − 1}.
We may assume that I = {0, . . . , |I| − 1}, so agents in A can be compared lexicographically. Our
reduction constructs a k-dsm-cyc instance Xˆ = (Aˆ, {Pˆαˆ}αˆ∈Aˆ) as follows.
• Let J = {0, . . . , (k − 1)2}. Let Iˆ = J × A and Aˆ = J × A × {0, . . . , k − 1}. For every agent
α ∈ A, we call J × {α} × {0, . . . , k − 1} the gadget corresponding to α.
• For every agent αˆ = (j, α, t) ∈ Aˆ such that j = 0 and α ∈ I × {t}, we call αˆ the non-
dummy agent corresponding to α. Let Pˆ ′α be the list obtained by replacing every α′ in Pα
by (0, α′, t⊕ 1). We define the preference list Pˆαˆ as Pˆ ′α · 〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈ J ×A×{t⊕ 1} | α′ = α〉
followed by the remaining agents in J ×A× {t⊕ 1} in an arbitrary order.
• For every agent αˆ = (j, α, t) ∈ Aˆ such that j = (k− 1)2, we call αˆ a boundary dummy agent,
and we define the preference list Pˆαˆ as
〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈ J ×A× {t⊕ 1} | α′ = α and j′ < (k − 1)2〉
· 〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈ J ×A× {t⊕ 1} | j′ = (k − 1)2〉
followed by the remaining agents in J ×A× {t⊕ 1} in an arbitrary order.
• For every agent αˆ = (j, α, t) ∈ Aˆ such that (j, α, t) /∈ {0} × (I × {t})× {t} and j < (k − 1)2,
we call αˆ a non-boundary dummy agent, and we define the preference list Pˆαˆ as 〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈
J ×A×{t⊕ 1} | α′ = α〉 followed by the remaining agents in J ×A×{t⊕ 1} in an arbitrary
order.
As shown in Figure 2(a), the gadget corresponding to α ∈ I × {t} can be visualized as a grid
of agents with k rows and (k − 1)2 columns. The non-boundary dummy agents in the same row
have essentially the same preferences, which begin with the agents in the next row from left to
right. The preferences of the boundary dummy agents are similar to those of the non-boundary
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(0, α, t)
(0, α, t⊕ 1)
(0, α, t⊕ 2)
(1, α, t)
(1, α, t⊕ 1)
(1, α, t⊕ 2)
(2, α, t)
(2, α, t⊕ 1)
(2, α, t⊕ 2)
(3, α, t)
(3, α, t⊕ 1)
(3, α, t⊕ 2)
(4, α, t)
(4, α, t⊕ 1)
(4, α, t⊕ 2)
non-dummy non-boundary dummy boundary dummy
(a) The structure of the gadget.
(0, α, t)
(0, α, t⊕ 1)
(0, α, t⊕ 2)
(1, α, t)
(1, α, t⊕ 1)
(1, α, t⊕ 2)
(2, α, t)
(2, α, t⊕ 1)
(2, α, t⊕ 2)
(3, α, t)
(3, α, t⊕ 1)
(3, α, t⊕ 2)
(4, α, t)
(4, α, t⊕ 1)
(4, α, t⊕ 2)
(b) The matching µˆ induced by µ when α is unmatched in µ.
(0, α, t)
(0, α, t⊕ 1)
(0, α, t⊕ 2)
(1, α, t)
(1, α, t⊕ 1)
(1, α, t⊕ 2)
(2, α, t)
(2, α, t⊕ 1)
(2, α, t⊕ 2)
(3, α, t)
(3, α, t⊕ 1)
(3, α, t⊕ 2)
(4, α, t)
(4, α, t⊕ 1)
(4, α, t⊕ 2)
(c) The matching µˆ induced by µ when α is matched in µ.
Figure 2: Example of a gadget corresponding to α ∈ I × {t} when k = 3. An arrow indicates that
the source agent is matched to the target agent.
dummy agents, except that they incorporate the other boundary dummy agents in a special manner.
Meanwhile, the preferences of the non-dummy agent (0, α, t) reflect the preferences of agent α by
starting with Pˆ ′α.
4.2 Correctness of the Reduction
Lemmas 2 and 3 below show that the reduction in Section 4.1 is a correct reduction from k-dsmi-
cyc to k-dsm-cyc. The associated proofs are presented in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Lemma 2. Let k ≥ 3. Consider the reduction given in Section 4.1. If the input k-dsmi-cyc
instance X has no weakly stable matching, then the output k-dsm-cyc instance Xˆ has no weakly
stable matching.
Lemma 3. Let k ≥ 3. Consider the reduction in Section 4.1. If the input k-dsmi-cyc instance X
has a weakly stable matching, then the output k-dsm-cyc instance Xˆ has a weakly stable matching.
Theorem 4. Let k ≥ 3. Then there exists a k-dsm-cyc instance that has no weakly stable match-
ing.
Proof. By Theorem 2, there exists a k-dsmi-cyc instance X that has no weakly stable matching.
Then Lemma 2 implies that given X as an input, the reduction in Section 4.1 produces a k-dsm-
cyc instance Xˆ that has no weakly stable matching.
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Theorem 5. Let k ≥ 3. Then it is NP-complete to determine whether a k-dsm-cyc instance has
a weakly stable matching.
Proof. By Theorem 3, it is NP-complete to determine whether a k-dsmi-cyc instance has a weakly
stable matching. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply the correctness of the reduction from k-dsmi-cyc to
k-dsm-cyc presented in Section 4.1. Moreover, the reduction can be implemented in poly(n, k)
time, where n is the number of agents of each type. Theorem 1 implies that the problem of
determining whether a k-dsm-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching is in NP. Thus the problem
of determining whether a k-dsm-cyc instance has a weakly stable matching is NP-complete.
4.3 Properties of the Gadget
In this subsection, we study the properties of the gadget in the scenario that the non-dummy agent
is not matched to a non-dummy agent corresponding to an acceptable partner. In Lemma 4, we
show that in this scenario, many agents in the gadget are matched to agents in the same gadget.
In Lemma 5, we apply Lemma 4 inductively to show that in the same scenario, every agent in the
same family as the non-dummy agent belongs to the same gadget.
Lemma 4. Let µˆ be a weakly stable matching in Xˆ. Let t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1} and α∗ ∈ I ×{t∗} such
that µˆ(0, α∗, t∗) is not in Pˆ ′α∗. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1} and j ∈ J such that j ≤ (k− 1) · (k− 2). Then
µˆ(j, α∗, t) ∈ {0, . . . , j + k − 1} × {α∗} × {t⊕ 1}.
Proof. Let Aˆs = 〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈ J ×{α∗}×{t⊕ s⊕1} | j′ ≤ j+k− s−1〉 for every s ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose µˆ(j, α∗, t) is not in Aˆ0.
For every s ∈ {0, . . . , k− 2}, since the length of Aˆs is greater than the length of Aˆs+1, there ex-
ists αˆs in Aˆs such that µˆ(αˆs) is not in Aˆs+1. Let αˆk−1 = (j, α∗, t). Then αˆk−1 is in Aˆk−1 and µˆ(αˆk−1)
is not in Aˆ0. Since µˆ is a weakly stable matching of Xˆ, the family (αˆk−t−1, . . . , αˆ(k−t−1)⊕(k−1)) is
not strongly blocking. So there exists s∗ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that αˆs∗ does not prefer αˆs∗⊕1 to
µ(αˆs∗). Since αˆs∗ is in Aˆs∗ , there exists j∗ ≤ j + k− s∗ − 1 such that αˆs∗ = (j∗, α∗, t⊕ s∗ ⊕ 1). We
consider two cases.
Case 1: j∗ = 0 and t⊕s∗⊕1 = t∗. Then αˆs∗ = (0, α∗, t∗) is a non-dummy agent and Pˆ ′α∗ · Aˆs∗⊕1
is a prefix of the preference list Pˆαˆs∗ . Since µ(αˆs∗) is not in Pˆ ′α∗ · Aˆs∗⊕1 and αˆs∗⊕1 is in Aˆs∗⊕1, agent
αˆs∗ prefers αˆs∗⊕1 to µ(αˆs∗), a contradiction.
Case 2: j∗ 6= 0 or t⊕ s∗ ⊕ 1 6= t∗. We consider two subcases.
Case 2.1: j∗ = (k − 1)2. Since (k − 1)2 = j∗ ≤ j + k − s∗ − 1 ≤ (k − 1)2 − s∗, we have s∗ = 0.
Hence αˆ0 = ((k − 1)2, α∗, t ⊕ 1) is a boundary dummy agent and Aˆ1 is a prefix of the preference
list Pˆαˆ0 . Since µ(αˆ0) is not in Aˆ1 and αˆ1 is in Aˆ1, agent αˆ0 prefers αˆ1 to µ(αˆ0), a contradiction.
Case 2.2: j∗ < (k− 1)2. Then αˆs∗ is a non-boundary dummy agent and Aˆs∗⊕1 is a prefix of the
preference list Pˆαˆs∗ . Since µ(αˆs∗) is not in Aˆs∗⊕1 and αˆs∗⊕1 is in Aˆs∗⊕1, agent αˆs∗ prefers αˆs∗⊕1 to
µ(αˆs∗), a contradiction.
Remark 1. In the proof of Lemma 4, we can think of αˆ0, . . . , αˆk−1 as a chain of admirers in the
gadget corresponding to α, where αˆs prefers αˆs+1 to µˆ(αˆs). By applying the weak stability condition
to this chain of admirers, we show that αˆk−1 is matched to a partner no worse than αˆ0.
Lemma 5. Let µˆ be a weakly stable matching in Xˆ. Let j0, . . . , jk−1 ∈ J and α0, . . . , αk−1 ∈ A
such that ((j0, α0, 0), . . . , (jk−1, αk−1, k − 1)) ∈ µˆ. Let t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that jt∗ = 0 and
αt∗ ∈ I×{t∗}. Suppose that (jt∗⊕1, αt∗⊕1, t∗⊕ 1) is not in Pˆ ′αt∗ . Then, for every s ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1},
we have αt∗⊕s = αt∗ and jt∗⊕s ≤ (k − 1) · s.
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Proof. We prove the claim by induction on s. When s = 0, we have αt∗⊕s = αt∗⊕0 = αt∗ and
jt∗⊕s = jt∗ = 0 ≤ (k − 1) · s.
Suppose αt∗⊕(s−1) = αt∗ and jt∗⊕(s−1) ≤ (k − 1) · (s − 1), where s ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Since
(jt∗⊕1, αt∗⊕1, t∗ ⊕ 1) is not in Pˆ ′αt∗ , agent µˆ(0, αt∗ , t∗) is not in Pˆ ′αt∗ . Let t = t∗ ⊕ (s − 1). Then
αt = αt∗⊕(s−1) = αt∗ and jt = jt∗⊕(s−1) ≤ (k − 1) · (s − 1) ≤ (k − 1) · (k − 2). So Lemma 4
implies that µˆ(jt, αt∗ , t) ∈ {0, . . . , jt + k − 1} × {αt∗} × {t ⊕ 1}. Hence jt⊕1 ≤ jt + k − 1 and
αt⊕1 = αt∗ , since µˆ(jt, αt∗ , t) = µˆ(jt, αt, t) = (jt⊕1, αt⊕1, t ⊕ 1). Thus αt∗⊕s = αt⊕1 = αt∗ and
jt∗⊕s = jt⊕1 ≤ jt + k − 1 = jt∗⊕(s−1) + k − 1 ≤ (k − 1) · (s− 1) + k − 1 = (k − 1) · s.
4.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The goal of this subsection is to prove Lemma 2. It suffices to show that every weakly stable
matching µˆ in Xˆ induces a weakly stable matching µ in X.
Recall that each agent in A has a corresponding non-dummy agent in Aˆ, and that a family in X
is a tuple of k agents in A such that each agent appears in the preference list of another. Hence
we include in µ a family of agents in X whenever the corresponding family of non-dummy agents
are matched in µˆ. More formally, we define the matching µ in X induced by µˆ in Xˆ as the set
of families (α0, . . . , αk−1) in X satisfying ((0, α0, 0), . . . , (0, αk−1, k − 1)) ∈ µˆ. Notice that every µ
induced by a matching µˆ in Xˆ is a valid matching in X since agent-disjoint families in Xˆ induce
agent-disjoint families in X.
Lemma 6 below shows that if µˆ is weakly stable and matches a non-dummy agent to a non-
dummy agent corresponding to an acceptable partner, then µ matches the corresponding agents.
Our proof relies on Lemma 5 and the weak stability of µˆ. Notice that if µˆ is not weakly stable, it
may be the case that µˆ matches a family consisting of k − 1 non-dummy agents and one dummy
agent. In such a case, the corresponding k − 1 agents are unmatched in the induced matching µ.
Lemma 6. Let µ be the matching in X induced by a weakly stable matching µˆ in Xˆ. Let t ∈
{0, . . . , k − 1} and α ∈ I × {t} such that µˆ(0, α, t) is in Pˆ ′α. Then µˆ(0, α, t) = (0, µ(α), t⊕ 1).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose µˆ(0, α, t) 6= (0, µ(α), t ⊕ 1). Since µˆ(0, α, t) is in Pˆ ′α,
we have ((j0, α0, 0), . . . , (jk−1, αk−1, k − 1)) ∈ µˆ for some j0, . . . , jk−1 ∈ J and α0, . . . , αk−1 ∈ A
such that (jt, αt, t) = (0, α, t) and (jt⊕1, αt⊕1, t⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′α. Let
T = {t′ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} | αt′ ∈ I × {t′} and (jt′⊕1, αt′⊕1, t′ ⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′αt′}.
Then t ∈ T . We consider two cases.
Case 1: T = {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then for every t′ ∈ T = {0, . . . , k − 1}, we have αt′ ∈ I × {t′} and
(jt′⊕1, αt′⊕1, t′ ⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′αt′ . So jt′⊕1 = 0 and αt′⊕1 is in Pαt′ for every t′ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Hence
(α0, . . . , αk−1) is a valid family in X. Since µ is induced by µˆ and ((0, α0, 0), . . . , (0, αk−1, k−1)) ∈ µˆ,
we have (α0, . . . , αk−1) ∈ µ. Thus µ(α) = µ(αt) = αt⊕1, which contradicts (0, µ(α), t ⊕ 1) 6=
µˆ(0, α, t) = (0, αt⊕1, t⊕ 1).
Case 2: T 6= {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then there exists a smallest s∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} such that t⊕ s∗ /∈
T . Then t ⊕ (s∗ − 1) ∈ T . Let t∗ = t ⊕ s∗. Since t∗ ⊕ (−1) = t ⊕ (s∗ − 1) ∈ T , we have
αt∗⊕(−1) ∈ I ×{t∗⊕ (−1)} and (jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) is in Pˆ ′αt∗⊕(−1) . So jt∗ = 0 and αt∗ is in Pαt∗⊕(−1) . Hence
αt∗ ∈ I×{t∗}. Since αt∗ ∈ I×{t∗} and t∗ = t⊕s∗ /∈ T , agent (jt∗⊕1, αt∗⊕1, t∗⊕1) is not in Pˆ ′αt∗ . So
Lemma 5 implies αt∗⊕(k−1) = αt∗ . Hence αt∗⊕(−1) = αt∗⊕(k−1) = αt∗ ∈ I × {t∗}, which contradicts
αt∗⊕(−1) ∈ I × {t∗ ⊕ (−1)}.
Proof of Lemma 2. For the sake of contradiction, suppose X has no weakly stable matching and
Xˆ has a weakly stable matching µˆ. Let µ be the matching in X induced by µˆ.
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Since µ is not a weakly stable matching ofX, there exists a strongly blocking family (α0, . . . , αk−1).
Since µˆ is a weakly stable matching of Xˆ, the family
((0, α0, 0), . . . , (0, αk−1, k − 1))
is not strongly blocking. So there exists t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that (0, αt, t) does not prefer
(0, αt⊕1, t ⊕ 1) to µˆ(0, αt, t). Since (α0, . . . , αk−1) is a family in X, agent αt⊕1 is in Pαt . So
(0, αt⊕1, t⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′αt . Hence µˆ(0, αt, t) appears in Pˆ ′αt no later than (0, αt⊕1, t⊕ 1), since Pˆ ′αt is
a prefix of the preference list Pˆ(0,αt,t).
Since µˆ(0, αt, t) is in Pˆ ′αt , Lemma 6 implies µˆ(0, αt, t) = (0, µ(αt), t ⊕ 1). Since (0, µ(αt), t ⊕
1) appears in Pˆ ′αt no later than (0, αt⊕1, t ⊕ 1), agent µ(αt) appears in Pαt no later than αt⊕1.
Hence αt does not prefer αt⊕1 to µ(αt). So (α0, . . . , αk−1) is not a strongly blocking family of µ,
a contradiction.
4.5 Proof of Lemma 3
The goal of this subsection is to prove Lemma 3. It suffices to show that every weakly stable
matching µ in X induces a weakly stable matching µˆ in Xˆ. We construct the matching µˆ induced
by µ as follows.
• For every (α0, . . . , αk−1) ∈ µ, we include in µˆ the family
((0, α0, 0), . . . , (0, αk−1, k − 1)).
• For every agent α ∈ A and j ∈ J such that j < (k − 1)2, we include in µˆ the family
((j + δ0(α), α, 0), . . . , (j + δk−1(α), α, k − 1)), where
δt(α) =
{
1 if µ(α) 6= α and α ∈ I × {t}
0 otherwise
• For every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, let Rt be the list
〈(j′, α′, t′) ∈ {(k − 1)2} ×A× {t} | δt′(α′) = 0〉.
We include in µˆ the family (R0[s], . . . , Rk−1[s]) for every 0 ≤ s < |A|−|µ|, where Rt[s] denotes
the (s+ 1)th element of Rt.
Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show the gadget under the matching µˆ.
It is straightforward to check that the families in µˆ induced by a matching µ are agent-disjoint.
Hence µˆ is a valid matching in Xˆ.
Lemma 7. Let µˆ be the matching in Xˆ induced by a matching µ in X. Let t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and
α ∈ A such that α ∈ I × {t}. Let j′ ∈ J and α′ ∈ A such that non-dummy agent (0, α, t) prefers
(j′, α′, t⊕ 1) to µˆ(0, α, t). Then (j′, α′, t⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′α and α prefers α′ to µ(α).
Proof. Notice that Pˆ ′α · 〈(0, α, t ⊕ 1)〉 is a prefix of the preference list Pˆ(0,α,t) of non-dummy agent
(0, α, t). We consider two cases.
Case 1: µ(α) 6= α. Then µˆ(0, α, t) = (0, µ(α), t ⊕ 1). Since (0, α, t) prefers (j′, α′, t ⊕ 1) to
(0, µ(α), t⊕ 1), agent (j′, α′, t⊕ 1) appears in Pˆ ′α before (0, µ(α), t⊕ 1). Hence α prefers α′ to µ(α).
Case 2: µ(α) = α. Then µˆ(0, α, t) = (0, α, t ⊕ 1). Since (0, α, t) prefers (j′, α′, t ⊕ 1) to
(0, α, t⊕ 1), agent (j′, α′, t⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′α. Then α′ is in Pα, and hence α prefers α′ to µ(α).
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Lemma 8. Let µˆ be the matching in Xˆ induced by a weakly stable matching µ in X. Let
j0, . . . , jk−1 ∈ J and α0, . . . , αk−1 ∈ A such that
((j0, α0, 0), . . . , (jk−1, αk−1, k − 1))
is a strongly blocking family of µˆ. Then jt − δt(αt) ≥ (k − 1)2 for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Proof. Let t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that
jt∗ − δt∗(αt∗) = min
t∈{0,...,k−1}
(jt − δt(αt)).
For the sake of contradiction, suppose jt∗ − δt∗(αt∗) < (k − 1)2. We consider two cases.
Case 1: jt∗ = 0 and αt∗ ∈ I × {t∗}. Let T = {t | jt = 0 and αt ∈ I × {t}}. Then t∗ ∈ T . We
consider two subcases.
Case 1.1: T = {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} = T , since (0, αt, t) prefers
(0, αt⊕1, t⊕ 1) to µˆ(0, αt, t), Lemma 7 implies that αt prefers αt⊕1 to µ(αt). Hence (α0, . . . , αk−1)
is a strongly blocking family of µ, which contradicts the stability of µ.
Case 1.2: {t∗} ⊆ T ( {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then there exists s∗ such that s∗ ∈ T and s∗ ⊕ 1 /∈ T .
Since s∗ ∈ T , we have js∗ = 0 and αs∗ ∈ I × {s∗}. Since (0, αs∗ , s∗) prefers (js∗⊕1, αs∗⊕1, s∗ ⊕ 1)
to µˆ(0, αs∗ , s∗), Lemma 7 implies that (js∗⊕1, αs∗⊕1, s∗ ⊕ 1) is in Pˆ ′αs∗ . Hence js∗⊕1 = 0 and
αs∗⊕1 ∈ I × {s∗ ⊕ 1}, which contradicts s∗ ⊕ 1 /∈ T .
Case 2: Either jt∗ 6= 0 or αt∗ /∈ I × {t∗}. Thus (jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) is a dummy agent. We consider two
subcases.
Case 2.1: jt∗ < (k − 1)2. Since
µˆ(jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) = (jt∗ + δt∗⊕1(αt∗)− δt∗(αt∗), αt∗ , t∗ ⊕ 1),
and the non-boundary dummy agent (jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) prefers (jt∗⊕1, αt∗⊕1, t∗ ⊕ 1) to µˆ(jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗), we
have jt∗⊕1 < jt∗ + δt∗⊕1(αt∗)− δt∗(αt∗), which contradicts the definition of t∗.
Case 2.2: jt∗ = (k − 1)2. Then δt∗(αt∗) = 1 since jt∗ − δt∗(αt∗) < (k − 1)2. So αt∗ ∈ I × {t∗},
and hence δt∗⊕1(αt∗) = 0. Since
µˆ(jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) = (jt∗ − 1, αt∗ , t∗ ⊕ 1)
and the boundary dummy agent (jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗) prefers (jt∗⊕1, αt∗⊕1, t∗ ⊕ 1) to µˆ(jt∗ , αt∗ , t∗), we have
jt∗⊕1 < jt∗ − 1 = jt∗ + δt∗⊕1(αt∗)− δt∗(αt∗), which contradicts the definition of t∗.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose X has a weakly stable matching µ. Let µˆ be the matching in Xˆ
induced by µ. It suffices to show that µˆ does not admit a strongly blocking family.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose µˆ admits a strongly blocking family
((j0, α0, 0), . . . , (jk−1, αk−1, k − 1)).
Lemma 8 implies that for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, we have jt−δt(αt) ≥ (k−1)2. Since jt ≤ (k−1)2
and δt(αt) ≥ 0, we deduce that jt = (k − 1)2 and δt(αt) = 0 for every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Hence for
every t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, there exists st such that (jt, αt, t) = Rt[st].
Let t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such that
st∗ = min
t∈{0,...,k−1}
st.
Since µˆ(Rt∗ [st∗ ]) = Rt∗⊕1[st∗ ] and the boundary dummy agent Rt∗ [st∗ ] prefers boundary dummy
agent Rt∗⊕1[st∗⊕1] to boundary dummy agent µˆ(Rt∗ [st∗ ]), we deduce that Rt∗⊕1[st∗⊕1] is lexico-
graphically smaller than Rt∗⊕1[st∗ ]. Hence st∗⊕1 < st∗ , which contradicts the definition of t∗.
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that a 3-dsm-cyc instance need not admit a weakly stable matching, and that it is
NP-complete to determine whether a given 3-dsm-cyc instance admits a weakly stable matching.
It seems that for the three-dimensional stable matching problem, none of the preference structures
studied in the literature admits a non-trivial generalization of the existence theorem of Gale and
Shapley. (The existence result in Danilov’s model [5] follows from applying the Gale-Shapley
algorithm in a straightforward manner.) It would be interesting to consider solution concepts such
as popular matchings instead of stable matchings in the multi-dimensional matching context.
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